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COMMENT: JACKSON V. INDIANA*
John E. Olsen**
From a very early time, the common law has kept
the incompetent accused from trial until he is able to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him.
"It is fundamental that an insane person can neither
plead to an arraignment, be subjected to a trial, or
after trial, receive judgment, or after judgment, under-
go punishment."1  This is a rule of long standing in
Anglo-American criminal law. It has been assumed to be
a rule of constitutional stature, with the protective
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the
2
Fourteenth Amendment.
Incompetency at the time of trial is dealt with
3
by statute in Indiana, as it is most other states.
These statutes usually provide that a person determined
to be incompetent to stand trial shall be committed to
a state hospital until he has recovered sufficiently to
stand trial. The superintendent of the institution
decides when the accused has attained the requisite
degree of competency to stand trial.
4
It is required under the Indiana statute that a
defendant be committed whenever he is found to be in-
competent. The state need only prove that the defen-
dant is unable to stand trial. This may be signifi-
* 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
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cantly different from proving that the defendant is
"mentally ill" in the civil sense. 5 Briefly, this
difference between civil commitment and commitments
before trial, arises from the fact that much more evi-
dence of mental incapacity is required where a civil
commitment is sought. Whereas, the incompetent defen-
dant need only be proven deficient in "comprehension
sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his
defense."6 Additionally, the Indiana commitment-before-
trial statute (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-1706a) specifies no
date of the cornmrancement oi the criminal proceedings
against him more certain than "when the defendant shall
become sane."
Theon Jackson stood accused cf the robbery of a
total of $9.00 from two women. He was a mentally de-
fective deaf mute with the mental age of a pre-school
child. He could neither read nor write, nor could he
communicate except for the limited use of sign language.
In May of 1968, Jackson came before the Criminal Court
of Marion County (Indiana) charged with these robberies.
The trial judge scheduled a hearing to determine if
Jackson was competent to stand trial pursuant to the
Indiana Law (Ind. Ann. Stat. §9-1706a). At the hearing
two appointed psychiatrists and a teacher from the
state school for the deaf testified that they had all
interviewed Jackson, and that they agreed that he was
unable to understand the nature of the charges against
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him. They also agreed that there was virtually no
possibility that Jackson could ever improve his com-
prehension sufficiently to be tried, even if he acquired
a means of communication. Thus, to commit Jackson,
until such time as he could gain the adequate under-
standing to stand trial, would be, in effect, a
commitment for life.
The trial court ordered Jackson to be committed.
This order was then appealed to the Indiana Supreme
Court. Jackson contended there that: a) the statute
under which he was confined (§9-1706a) was inapplicable;
b) that he was deprived of due process of law; c) that!
in view of the improbability of his improvement he was,
in effect, given a life sentence. The majority
opinion of the Indiana Supreme Court disposed of
Jackson's three contentions in a rather summary fashion.
As to the first contention, they construed §9-1706a to
be broad enough to include the feeble-minded, as well
as the insane. An amendment added in 1967 substituted
the phrase "insane hospital" with the present phrase
"psychiatric hospital." The effect of this was a more
flexible procedure in committing patients to an
appropriate mental institution. The choice of
institution however, remains with the Department of
Mental Health, ". . . it is not for the appellant to
dictate." Jackson's second and third contentions were
rejected on the ground that the state has a police
power which provides that the legislature may act to
protect health, safety, and general welfare.
8
Judge DeBruler strongly dissented. His opinion
was directed to what he believed to be the inapplica-
bility of §9-1706a, saying that this statute was in-
tended to delay or postpone trial where the defendant
was mentally incapacitated. The dissent went on to
state:
When the defendant's condition is
permanent, as in this case, and he
cannot be helped by any known
psychiatric technique, then the
defendant cannot be committed under
this statute because the purpose of
the commitment cannot be accomplished.
Finally, the dissent pointed out that a commitment
such as this under §9-1706a would violate the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution.
This violation occurs because a civil commitment could
only take place upon a finding that one was suffering
from a psychiatric disorder which required "care,
treatment or detention in the interest of the welfare
of such person or the welfare of the community."
1 0
Since no such finding was made here, Judge DeBruler
argued that the criminal charges made against Jackson
were not a rational basis for treating him differently.
Jackson then appealed to the United States Supreme
Court.11 The Supreme Court (per Judge Blackmun) in a
unanimous opinion declared the Indiana procedure
committing Jackson violative of both the Equal Protec-
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tion and Due Process guaranties of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Regarding equal protection, before the Supreme
Court, Jackson argued that, but for the criminal
charges made against him, the decision whether to
commit him would have been made under a different
standard. He also argued that, if commitment were
warranted, applicable standards for release would have
been more lenient. Further, if civilly committed,
(i.e. pursuant to §22-1907 Ind. Ann. Stat.), he main-
tained that he could have been assigned to a special
institution affording appropriate care. Finally, he
stated that he would be entitled to certain privileges
otherwise not available to him, if committed pursuant
to §9-1706a.
An analysis of Baxstrom v. Herold 1 2 initialed the
court's discussion of these points. In that case the
Supreme Court held that one who was imprisoned and then
committed civilly at the end of his term, solely upon
the finding of the Surrogate, was denied equal protec-
tion when he was deprived of a jury trial, which the
State made available to all other persons civilly
committed. The Court had rejected an argument that
Baxstrom's conviction was adequate reason to provide
a different procedure in committing him. Applying the
Baxstrom principle to Jackson's case, the Court con-
cluded that the criminal charges against him were not
a rational basis for committing him in a manner
different from those who are civilly committed. More-
over, the court found that by subjecting Jackson to a
"more lenient commitment standard and to a more
stringent standard of release than those generally
applicable to all others not charged with offenses,"
13
Indiana had deprived him of equal protection.
The Court began its discussion on due process by
mentioning the federal commitment procedures, which are
similar to those of Indiana. The specific federal laws
in question are 18 U.S.C. H4244-4246. These provide
that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial may
be committed until he is found to be competent, "or
until the pending charges against him are disposed of
according to law. 14
In Greenwood v. United States. 1 5 the Court upheld
the commitment of a defendant who was mentally in-
competent and was deemed a danger to the safety of
officers and property of the United States. Greenwood
was entitled to release when found no longer dangerous,
even if he did not become incompetent to stand trial--
for this reason the commitment was found to be un-
constitutional. The federal courts, since Greenwood,
have not found constitutional any commitment in which
the defendant was given a poor chance of attaining com-
petency, thus resulting in the indefinite commitment.
1 6
Indiana relied on Greenwood in support of its commit-
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ment of Jackson. The Court distinguished Greenwood
saying that it upheld only the initial commitment
without considering directly its duration or the
standard for release. 1 7 Further, Greenwood's commit-
ment was sustained only upon the finding of dangerous-
ness.
In addition, the court commented at some length
regarding the disparity of commitment procedures in the
states, and the fact that many criminal defendants who
are committed never stand trial. The court also pointed
out that it is inequitable for the civilly committed to
be released earlier than those committed solely because
18
of their incapacity to stand trial. Thus, the court
held that when a defendant accused of a criminal
offense is committed solely due to his mental incapaci-
ty, the commitment can be for a reasonable time only,
and then, only to determine the probability "that he
will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future."
1 9
Ideally, the Anglo-American system will not permit
the trial of a person who cannot defend himself. This
principle is at the very center of our legal system.
Nevertheless, the difficulty here is that administra-
tion of the commitment procedures varies markedly,
depending upon the interpreter's view of the substan-
tive criminal law as well as his views on criminal
responsibility and mental rehabilitation.20
Committing a defendant, and then subjecting him
to a "wait-and-see" approach has clearly failed, as
Jackson is witness. "Wait-and-see" has resulted in an
abuse of discretion and inadequate assurance of trial.
Indiana places the initiative in determining whether a
patient has achieved the requisite mental capacity in
the hands of the superintendent of the hospital, who
is to certify this fact to the court.
2 1
The Jackson decision in a marked way reflects the
growing recognition and concern for the rights of the
mentally ill and mentally retarded among some signi-
22
ficant elements of our society. In 1961, it was
estimated that there were 720,000 involuntarily commit-
23
ted mental patients in this country. Recent estimates
have placed the figure at approximately the same
level. 24 The recognition given the mentally incapaci-
tated by the Supreme Court, and the numbers there in-
volved, would seem to indicate that there is a further
need to deal with the problem legislatively.
There exists the necessity to develop and to
redefine standards and procedures for correctly hand-
ling the over-all problem of competency for trial. The
courts are uncertain as to the specific criteria that
need be met to determine whether a defendant is, in
fact, incompetent to stand trial. The uncertainty
stems from the confusion within the present laws and
lack of any pertinent provisions within the states'
codes. 2 5 The result is: either the indeterminate con-
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finement in a mental facility of those who are com-
petent to stand trial, but are seen as dangerous or in
need of medical treatment; or, the trial of those who
are incompetent to stand trial.
The result in Jackson v. Indiana is of a watershed
nature. The Supreme Court has addressed itself to this
area rather well. It remains for the state legislature
to enact specific substantive standards and fair pro-
cedures, that Theon Jackson's case shall never be
repeated.
APPENDIX
9-1706a. Commitment before trial-subsequent
actions. When at any time before the trial of any
criminal cause or during the progress thereof and be-
fore the final submission of the cause to the court or
jury trying the same, the court, either from his own
knowledge or upon the suggestion of any person, has
reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be
insane, he shall immediately fix a time for a hearing
to determine the question of the defendant's sanity
and shall appoint two (2) competent disinterested
physicians who shall examine the defendant upon the
question of his sanity and testify concerning the same
at the hearing.
At the hearing, other evidence may be introduced
to prove the defendant's sanity or insanity. If the
court shall find that the defendant has comprehension
sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal
action against him and the proceedings thereon and to
make his defense, the trial shall not be delayed or
continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the
defendant.
If the court shall find that the defendant has not
comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings
and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or
continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the
defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant
has not comprehension sufficient to understand the pro-
ceedings and make his defense, the court shall order
the defendant committed to the department of mental
health, to be confined by the department in an
appropriate psychiatric institution.
Whenever the defendant shall become sane, the
superintendent of the state psychiatric hospital shall
certify the fact to the proper court, who shall enter
an order on his record directing the sheriff to return
the defendant, or the court may enter such order in
the first instance whenever he shall be sufficiently
advised of the defendant's restoration to sanity.
Upon the return to the court of any defendant so
committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial
for the criminal offense the same as if no delay or
postponement has (had) occurred by reason of the
defendant's insanity.
The term "qualified psychiatrist" shall mean any
person who holds an unlimited license to practice
medicing in the State of Indiana and who is certified
by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology,
Incorporated, or who is eligible for such certification.
The term "qualified physician" shall mean any
person who holds an unlimited license to practice
medicing in the State of Indiana.
The term "resident" shall mean a person who has
lived in the State of Indiana for at least one (1) year
continuously prior to his admission to any psychiatric
hospital: Provided, That any time spent by such person
in a public or private psychiatric hospital or institu-
tion shall not be included in the computation of the
one (1) year residence requirement: Provided, further,
That, in the event a person has been a resident of a
state with which state the State of Indiana has no
reciprocal agreement, the residence requirements for
such person to gain admission to any psychiatric
hospital of this state shall not be less than the resi-
dence requirements of the state of the former residence
of such person.
The term "administrator" shall mean any person
who is the chief administrative officer of any hospital,
sanitarium, institution, agency or instrumentality,
maintained or provided by the government of the United
States, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, where-
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in mental illnesses are treated: Provided, That wherever
the term administrator is used in this chapter (§022-
1201 - 22-1231), or is used in any court order, it
shall include his successor or successors.
22-1209 (IC 16-14-9-9). Jurisdiction of court -
Determination of mental illness -Procedure. The mental
illness of any person who is alleged to be mentally ill
shall be adjudged by the judges of the circuit or
superior courts of the State of Indiana; Provided, That
in any county wherein is located a separate juvenile
court the mental illness of any juvenile may be
adjudged by the juvenile court of said county. Such
proceedings may be heard either in term time or in
vacation, and shall be private in nature: Provided,
that in the event the judge shall be unable to preside
therein by reason of serious illness or himself or
family, or for any cause which disqualifies the judges
of circuit or superior courts, including absence from
the county, a judge pro tempore may be appointed to
hear and conduct such proceedings. Persons who are
adjudged to be mentally ill may be committed to a
psychiatric hospital by the judges hearing and con-
ducting the proceeding. The procedures to be followed
in alleging and adjudging the mental illness of persons
and admitting persons adjudged to be mentally ill to
any psychiatric hospital shall be as prescribed in this
act (§§22-1201 - 22-1231).
All such proceedings to determine the mental
illness of persons alleged to be mentally ill shall be
restricted in attendance to persons directly concerned
with the proceedings and may include witnesses summoned,
responsible relatives or the next best friend of the
alleged mentally ill person, attorneys for such person,
the prosecuting attorney and such other persons who
may request attendance and the court may in its
discretion determine to have a legitimate interest in
the proceedings.
Jurisdiction of criminal sexual psychopathic
persons, who are charged with a criminal offense, is
vested in a court having criminal jurisdiction.
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